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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this project is to study the benefits that the Multiple Independent
Levels of Security (MILS) approach can provide to Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) remote terminal units. This is accomplished through a heavy
focus on MILS concepts such as resource separation, verification, and kernel
minimization and reduction. Two architectures are leveraged to study the application of
reduced kernel concepts for a remote terminal unit (RTU). The first is the LynxOS
embedded operating system, which is used to create a bootable image of a working RTU.
The second is the Pistachio microkernel, the features and development environment of
which are analyzed and catalogued to provide the basis for a future RTU.
A survey of recent literature is included that focuses on the state of SCADA
security, the MILS standard, and microkernel research. The design methodology for a
MILS compliant RTU is outlined, including a benefit analysis of applying MILS in an
industrial network setting. Also included are analyses of the concepts of MILS which are
relevant to the design and how LynxOS and Pistachio can be used to study some of these
concepts. A section detailing the prototyping of RTUs on LynxOS and Pistachio is also
included, followed by an initial security and performance analysis for both systems.
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CHAPTER I: Introduction

1.1 Background Information
This project falls under the umbrella of a larger SCADA research project at the
University of Louisville. The focus of that project is to mitigate the effects of threats
caused by electronic attacks on SCADA systems and has risen from ongoing research at
the University of Louisville that has centered around both SCADA security and
improving the monitoring process for chemical process control systems. The project is in
collaboration with industrial groups such as Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Eon-US Energy
Corp., and the Louisville Water Company. It is funded as part of the Kentucky Critical
Infrastructure Project.

1.2 Problem Statement
This project aims to produce a framework for a more secure SCADA RTU
(remote telemetry unit or remote terminal unit). At the outset of the project, the focus
was on applying the Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) standard to these
RTUs. However, those plans fell by the wayside as it became apparent that obtaining an
acceptable MILS specific operation system or kernel would not be possible within this
project’s time frame. As full MILS compliance is not currently available, this project
will instead focus on analyzing the security benefits that MILS could provide RTUs and
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provide an implementation of a hardened RTU which will exhibit some of these security
related features.
One such attempt was made by creating a minimal kernel using features provided
by LynxOS, a real time embedded operating system. This operating system provides the
means to modify the kernel and custom build bootable images to suit the users needs.
This allowed the creation of a minimal bootable system, providing only the functionality
needed for the RTU and nothing extraneous.
The second attempt utilized the concept of a predefined microkernel to run the
RTU software. This project uses the Pistachio microkernel created by the L4Ka group at
the University of Karlsruhe, and is based on the L4 microkernel specification. The
reasons each of these alternate approaches was pursued will be explained in detail in later
sections of this document.

1.3 Motivation
SCADA systems are used in critical infrastructure. Increasingly, communication
between the central SCADA master system and the RTUs is occurring over the Internet
or other network connections. The exposure of these RTUs to the network opens them up
to the problems all other networked computers face: attacks from malicious or malignant
entities that desire and attempt to harm the system. Network based attacks such as
intrusion, denial of service, and worms are all serious risks that must be considered when
connecting critical infrastructure equipment to the Internet.
SCADA systems use the DNP-3 protocol for communication between the master
unit and the RTUs. DNP-3 provides data fragmentation, error checking, and other
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features and operates between the physical layer and the networking layer of the network.
Higher level networking functions are increasingly transmitted using TCP/IP, tying in to
SCADA’s increasing reliance on the Internet. There has been research that falls under
the same umbrella as the parent project of this MILS project, namely the overlying
SCADA research at the University of Louisville, which has focused on enhancing the
DNP-3 protocols [36]. However, even if these protocols are perfect and perfectly secure,
as long as communication occurs over the Internet between the RTU and master unit,
there will be a risk of attacks such as denial of service (DOS) that can bypass DNP-3.
Since it is inevitable that many SCADA systems will utilize the Internet for its
familiarity, ease of use, and wealth of available tools and documentation, a researcher
into security for SCADA systems must focus on ways to make the entire communication
process more secure. The tasks that arise from this need can range from basic networking
security principles such as setting up routers and disabling remote logon, all the way up
to the overall security of the underlying operating system. The latter is the focus of this
project, which began as a way to research the benefits that the MILS standard would
supply to the operating system of the RTU.
The MILS standard provides a verifiably secure kernel, as well as many other
features which, upon inspection, provide security synergy with the functional aspects of
SCADA RTUs. The most important feature to provide this type of synergy is
partitioning. MILS defines a method of brick-wall partitioning of memory, kernel access,
and other system resources. “Brick-wall” means the operations of one partition cannot
affect another partition, meaning any errors occurring in, for example, a dedicated
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networking partition could not cascade and affect monitoring applications in another
partition.
A verifiably secure kernel can also provide a huge enhancement to the confidence
in security of the overall system. Mathematical verification of most kernels is
impossible, given the size of the code base of many kernels can approach millions of
lines of code. The MILS kernel should provide all base functionality needed for system
operations, but will be small enough for mathematical verification. This principle
removes all extraneous functionality from the kernel, removing with it the problems of
complexity, bloat, and potential security flaws in extraneous methods or code.
These two elements of the MILS standard, namely resource partitioning and a
minimal, verifiable kernel, are what lead to this project’s focus on applying the standard
to SCADA RTUs. If any benefits can be gleaned from such a pairing, infrastructure
monitor and control systems would be safer even with communications occurring over
the Internet.

1.4 Organization
Chapter Two focuses on the literature available covering SCADA security, the
MILS architecture, and microkernel design and security. Chapter Three outlines the
concepts of designing a hardened RTU, explain why the MILS standard is appropriate for
such devices, and detail the ideas which produced the two related, but ultimately nonMILS prototypes created during this project. Chapter Four discusses the details and
implementation of these prototype RTUs, one created using the LynxOS kernel image
creation tools and the basis of another utilizing the L4 Pistachio microkernel. Chapter
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Five provides analysis and applies metric measurements and performance evaluation on
each of the two base systems, addressing security and performance related questions.
Chapter Six discusses any conclusions determined through the course of this project, as
well as future directions for hardened RTU research, including a fully MILS compliant
RTU and what further benefits that might bring.
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CHAPTER II: Literature Review

2.1 SCADA Systems
2.1.1 Overview
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have been used for
years by industry and infrastructure providers such as power and water plants as a means
of controlling distributed systems from a master location [1]. The typical SCADA
system consists of a centralized master control unit (sometimes called an MTU, or master
terminal unit) and distributed Remote Terminal (or Telemetry) Units (RTUs) that control
and monitor physical equipment and machines such as pumps, latches, and other control
machines. SCADA master units typically run on licensed operating systems such as Unix
and variants, with Microsoft Windows also becoming more widely used. These operating
systems provide the human users with an interface to the SCADA system in order to
monitor and control the overall distributed system from the master unit.

2.1.2 SCADA RTUs
The RTUs provide the distributed backbone of a SCADA system. RTUs are often
hardened computers with some type of connection back to the master via either a serial
port, on board modem [2], or, increasingly, via the Internet or a Local Area Network
(LAN). The functions of the RTU include acting as an arbiter for control functions at a
location remote to the master unit, and monitoring and collecting data from the local site.
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There are two types of RTUs: ‘single board’ and ‘modular’. A single board RTU
contains all chips and circuitry necessary for I/O and processing on a single board while a
modular RTU has separate modules for CPU, memory, I/O, and other functions [2]. This
project will focus on using a hardened PC to act as an RTU, implying that a modular
RTU approach will be required.
RTUs collect data called points to be sent back to the master unit for storage
inside a database. Each point represents a monitored input or output controlled by the
overall SCADA system. A so-called “hard point” is data that is directly input or output
by the system, while a “soft point” is data derived from mathematical operations, usually
carried out at the RTU. [1] Complex SCADA systems can have as many as 30,000 to
50,000 points at once, indicating the necessity of computers for monitoring and control
purposes. Graphs of the status of certain points are often created to improve
understanding of system states by human administrators and users. [3] The volume of
data also suggests the need for high bandwidth communication from the distributed RTUs
back to the master control unit.

2.1.3 Recent SCADA Security Breaches
SCADA security is currently a hot-button issue, and many organizations both
industrial and governmental have studied methods for improvement. First of all, a
number of articles have been published in relation to security breaches in plants
providing power and other infrastructure needs. Brown’s article “SCADA vs. the
hackers” [4] provides insight into a number of attacks that would be possible, including
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wireless leaks and overall OS security breaches. However, there are more concrete
examples of breaches in SCADA security.
In 2003, the Slammer worm impacted the network of the Davis-Besse Nuclear
Power Plant in Ohio. The worm infected the internal network of the plant via an
unpatched vulnerability in MS-SQL and caused slowdown of the plant network,
ultimately leading to the shutdown of the plants safety monitoring system. [16] In a
separate incident in 2001, hackers attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to breach the network
of CAL-ISO, the company overseeing much of California’s power grid [17]. These
incidents paint a disturbing picture of the need for a security focus for SCADA systems.

2.1.4 Current SCADA Security Research
Many groups have conducted research and published findings on SCADA
security in recent years. For example, a paper presented to the 2005 IEEE Systems, Man
and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop outlines best practices for next
generation SCADA security systems. Topics include the use of demilitarized zones
(DMZ) between the SCADA system and the Internet, as well as combating denial of
service (DoS) attacks by using a modified TCP protocol for transport level
communication. [18]
One article that underlines the emerging trend to integrate SCADA systems with
the Internet is [19], which outlines the design of a web-based SCADA system using Java
and XML. This article does not focus on security, which brings forth the need for a
security paradigm to possibly be separate from the implementation of the SCADA
system, such as within the underlying OS and kernel.
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Other works covering similar themes as these two articles include [20], [21] and
[22], all articles from the past two years dealing with security, both long- and short-term,
for SCADA systems. There are many other such articles in, for example, the IEEE
Xplore article database, indicating the need and desire from the research community to
find better solutions to SCADA security quandaries.

2.2 SCADA and the Internet
2.2.1 Usage
The Internet has become a crucial component of most SCADA systems today. In
fact, it has been stated that, “…it is almost impossible today to buy remote terminal units
or control systems that are not Web- or network-enabled.” [4] The benefits that the
Internet provides to SCADA systems are obvious. First of all, the protocols used in
Internet communication are commonly known, as well as easy to implement and use.
This allows operators setting up SCADA distributed networks to focus on the functions
of the separate components and not how they communicate. It also provided the means
for reliable high-bandwidth data transfer that is essential for large, critical SCADA
systems.

2.2.2 Risks
However, placing SCADA communication over the public Internet has opened up
the potential for many security risks. The possibility of intruders into a SCADA system
cannot be ignored. Indeed, one security survey of a nuclear power plant which used
9

modems for dial-in access revealed several unregistered modems had accessed the
network [4]. Intercepted messages can also be used to gain information about system
operation, and masquerade attacks can be used to plant false commands into an unsecured
communication channel [4]. Basically, any security problem that afflicts the Internet can
be applied to SCADA networks using this resource. RTUs can be taken over, data can be
intercepted, intruders can determine network topography and weak points, and so on.
The use of public standards such as Ethernet and TCP/IP in SCADA systems has
made the possibility of attack more likely. Studies have found that more than one third of
external security incidents use the Internet as the remote point of entry [30]. The same
study found a dramatic increase in the number of security incidents starting in 2001, with
an ever increasing percentage of such incidents being external in nature [30]. The
authors attribute this increase in external incidents to three factors. The first is the rise,
beginning with Code Red in 2001, of the automated worm attack. Such attacks likely
don’t target SCADA systems specifically, but are still a major risk to system stability if
infection were to occur. Second, the use of operating systems and software designed for
business requirements within the network of critical systems, exposing these systems to
common IT attacks such as viruses and backdoor exploits. Third is the increasing
interconnection of SCADA systems, creating interdependencies that can, without proper
study and design, open up new avenues for attack. [30]
Intent by hackers to break into critical infrastructure systems has also been
recently expressed. Such individuals often produce tools to aid in the breach of security
procedures, enabling those who do not have the skills to directly make an attack to do so
with the help of this software. Such tools, combined with an increasingly computer
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literate world population and the opening of SCADA systems to public standards, make
the difficult task of hacking into a SCADA system slightly easier and will no doubt
increase the frequency of attempts at such attacks. [31]

2.3 The MILS Security Standard
2.3.1 Definition
The acronym MILS stand for Multiple Independent Levels (or Layers) of
Security. MILS is a standard that has been designed to allow mathematical verification
of the security of core systems software by separating security functionality into four
security policies: Information Flow, Data Isolation, Periods Processing, and Damage
Limitation [5]. These functionalities are controlled by a partitioning kernel that oversees
resource and security management for the system. The concept of a separation kernel
used to divide memory into separate partitions for application use was first outlined in [6]
and [7] by John Rushby in the early 1980’s. The four security policies are described
below (paraphrased from [5] and [8]):
Information Flow control ensures that the flow of data between partitions is
authenticated end-to-end between sender and receiver. Information must arrive
only where intended by the sender.
Data Isolation ensures that each partition’s data is accessible only by that
partition, and that private data cannot be publicly accessed.
Periods Processing ensures that exploits using the processor and networking
hardware cannot give an intruder access to the system.
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Damage Limitation (or Fault Isolation) ensures that a failure in one partition will
not affect the performance or security of another partition. All failures must be
detected, contained, and recovered from locally.

By ensuring that a kernel is built from the ground up with these principles in mind, the
amount of security critical code can be drastically reduced. This in turn provides the
ability to apply rigorous mathematical tests and inspections to the kernel [8], something
that is not possible with current operating systems whose critical features may contain
millions of lines of code [9].

2.3.2 Evaluation of the MILS Kernel
One of the main objectives of MILS is for the separation kernel to be evaluated at
EAL 7 [9]. The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) are defined by the Common
Criteria, a set of internationally defined and recognized standards for evaluation of secure
software [10]. EAL 7 is the highest possible level of assurance, and states that software
must be formally (mathematically) verified, designed, and tested to attain an EAL 7
rating. By using small code for the separation kernel and security functions, as well as
enforcing NEATness (see following section), components used in MILS implementations
can be evaluated at EAL 6+ [8].
Evaluation consists of the process of verifying and testing, either formally or
informally, a given piece of software to ensure its compliance with the internationally
defined EALs. The following table outlines each EAL from 1 to 7 and provides a brief
description of each. Each EAL builds on the previous, so any tests performed at a lower
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level of assurance will be included in higher level assurance tests. These criteria are
formally defined and outlined in [10].
EAL
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Table 2.1 Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL)
Requirements for Verification
Functionally tested. Analyzes behavior and system documentation.
Structurally tested. Analyzes more detailed high-level design specifications.
Methodically tested and checked. More complete testing process.
Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed. Analyzes more detailed design
specifications and an implementation subset.
Semi-formally designed and tested. More structured architecture and semiformal design description required.
Semi-formally verified, designed, and tested. Requires improved analysis of
architecture and improved design description over EAL 5.
Formally verified, designed, and tested. More comprehensive testing required.
Formal (mathematical) proof of design and formal representations must be used
to assure security.
The formal verification required to meet EAL 7 is not currently possible with

today’s monolithic kernels, which can contain millions of lines of source code. The
MILS kernel seeks to alleviate this quandary using two methods. The first is to reduce
the amount of code in the kernel by removing functionality that can be obtained by higher
level applications while still enforcing the principle of NEATness. The second is to
provide brick wall partitioning, allowing for different levels of assurance for applications
running in separate partitions. [9] These concepts will be discussed in more detail later in
this document.

2.3.3 Properties of NEATness
NEATness is essential for an operating system to ensure security. NEAT is an
acronym for Non-Bypassable, Evaluatable, Always Invoked, and Tamperproof [8].
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These properties allow a high assurance level for overall systems security. These
attributes of secure operating systems are explained below (adapted from [5] and [8]):
Non-Bypassable means security functions cannot be avoided.
Evaluatable means that security functions can be formally verified and tested.
Always Invoked means security functions are invoked each time they are needed.
Tamperproof means poorly written or subversive code cannot modify security
functions and security related data.
MILS is the first publicly available approach to operating system design that allows for
NEATness in Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software and operating systems [8].

2.3.4 Partitioning Communication Systems

A Partitioning Communication System (PCS) is a middleware component of a
MILS OS which has authority over all communication between MILS partitions. While
those familiar with SCADA systems may recognize the acronym “PCS” to stand for
process control systems, this PCS is a MILS specific concept and the two shouldn’t be
confused. The four main policies that MILS is based on (Information Flow, Data
Isolation, Periods Processing, and Damage Limitation) are extended to cover end-to-end
communication between MILS partitions [5]. The MILS PCS uses the separation
kernel’s control over these four policies and applies them to communication between
partitions, and also communicates with network protocols and drivers to ensure the
policies are applied to incoming and outgoing network data [8]. This PCS, combined
with isolation of network components in a single partition, allows a high-assurance
backbone for distributed systems by ensuring tight application of security policies on
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transmitted data. The following diagram illustrates the function of PCS middleware in a
MILS RTU.

FIGURE 2.1: A PCS for a MILS RTU

2.3.5 Vendors Offering MILS or MILS-Like Products
A number of companies offer operating systems which implement, or will
implement, the MILS separation kernel. Green Hills software offers the INTEGRITY
line of operating systems utilizing MILS [11]. Wind River has been working on its own
real time operating system using the MILS architecture. This implementation uses a
15

Memory Management Unit (MMU) to protect the kernel from applications and to
partition system memory with their VxWorks OS [12].
LynxOS-178 from LynuxWorks is a popular embedded real-time Linux variant
which implements MILS partitioning [13]. Via correspondence with the company, it has
been learned that they plan on releasing an OS next year called either LynxSecure which
will add networking functionality out-of-the-box to their MILS compatible Linux variant
operating systems. It is worth noting that none of the above MILS implementations have
yet been verified at an EAL 6 or above, so they are not considered fully MILS compliant.
However, LynuxWorks is expecting an EAL 7 assurance level for their upcoming
product LynxSecure [14], which should allow for full MILS compliance of that operating
system.
Objective Interface Systems provides MILS based middleware components.
PCSexpress, their PCS implementation [15], is their major current contribution to MILS
middleware and could be combined with an aforementioned MILS OS to enable secure
networking capabilities on a PC.

2.3.6 Current MILS Research
To date, much of the work done on the MILS standard has been research and
theory oriented. There are a number of papers and articles outlining the design of a
MILS system and explaining the benefits such a system should provide for security. The
article by Van Fleet et al [8] is the quintessential example of such an article. This article
is the basis for much of the general knowledge about MILS’ applications and benefits.
The authors mention the current trend of combining MILS with other security
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applications such as the aviation standard DO-178B and ARINC-653, the Avionics
Application Software Standard Interface. MILS is often combined with other standards
to create a synergy of operation and enhance security. One example of such a
combination is the LynxOS-178 real time operating system (RTOS), which combines a
partitioning kernel with DO-178B certification and uses ARINC-653 style resource
partitioning [23].
The University of Idaho’s Center for Secure and Dependable Systems (CSDS) is
working on MILS partnered with such groups as the NSA, Lockheed-Martin, and the
aforementioned Objective Interface Systems. The objectives of the CSDS are to provide
mathematical foundations for concepts for MILS, as well as providing architectural
design guidance [24]. While most of the articles published on the CSDS website are
from 2002 and 2003, some of the Center’s members are still active in the MILS research
community.

2.3.7 Current Research on Applying MILS to SCADA
Little has been published in the way of applying MILS to SCADA systems, so
this project would seem to be leading the way in that regard. However, there has some
cross-pollination of interest in the two areas. Jim Alves-Foss, a prominent member of the
aforementioned CSDS, has also co-authored articles such as [25], which looks at
applications of security to real-time control and SCADA systems. This shows that other
researchers at least have some cross interest in the study of MILS and SCADA systems,
though they still have not yet combined the two.
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One of the few mentions of the combination of MILS and SCADA comes in the
form of a newsletter from the Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF), a
group which focuses on applications of security for SCADA systems and is supported by
the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). The newsletter in question
announces a conference in April of 2006 presenting a demonstration of the MILS
architecture. The newsletter notes that the security potential of MILS could be directly
transferable to critical systems such as SCADA networks, as well as financial, medical,
and consumer electronic areas. [26] This again shows that others are thinking along the
same lines as this project, though they also have still not attempted any implementation
or research directly.

2.4 Microkernels

2.4.1 General Microkernel Principles
Microkernels have been around for years in many forms. The idea behind such
constructs is to minimize the complexity of the kernel, providing greater security and
performance than more traditional kernels. This is accomplished by removing all
functionality that can be implemented at a higher level from the kernel code, leaving only
essential components inside the kernel. Higher level functionality is controlled by
programs known as servers which run on top of the kernel to provide services that do not
require direct access to the underlying hardware. The server approach provides greater
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flexibility to microkernel based systems, as any additional functionality can be added by
the creation of a new server for the task, so no modification to the kernel is required. [27]

2.4.2 The L4 Microkernel

The L4 microkernel is currently at the forefront of microkernel research and
development. This kernel was developed in the mid-nineties by Jochen Liedtke, one of
the main proponents of microkernel-based systems. Prior to L4, microkernels suffered
severe performance hits compared to traditional, monolithic kernels. L4 changed this by
dramatically improving inter process communication (IPC) overhead compared to
previous microkernels such as Mach. L4 does contain some drivers and a scheduler, the
functions of which could be handled by servers. They are included to make development
and setup easier for L4 programmers and users. [28]
The L4::Pistachio implementation of this microkernel was utilized in this project
as the basis of a secure RTU. Pistachio is maintained by the System Architecture Group
at the University of Karlsruhe, where Liedtke had worked prior to his death in 2001 [28].
Pistachio is the L4 implementation that supports the greatest amount of hardware, and is
licensed under the BSD license [29]. Pistachio was chosen as the L4 implementation for
this project because of the relatively large amount of documentation for it, as well as the
community that provides support for it at both the l4ka.org and l4hq.org websites.
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CHAPTER III: Designing a Hardened RTU with MILS

3.1 Applying MILS to SCADA RTUs
3.1.1 Current Operating System Security Paradigm
Most operating systems that are currently in wide use employ a “Penetrate and
Patch” [9] a.k.a. “fail-first patch-later” [5,8] system to provide security functions. Under
this paradigm, an operating system is released “into the wild” to be used by businesses
and home users. If a security failure is discovered, for example a hole or backdoor that
has been exploited by a hacker, a patch is released to repair the problem and prevent
future exploits using that particular security exploit. This paradigm allows the multitudes
of worms, viruses, and Trojans that are consistently on the news to cause serious damage
[9].
This approach to OS security is not acceptable for SCADA RTUs. SCADA
systems were created for use in critical systems and infrastructure. By their nature, they
can cause serious damage to property and persons if they are compromised. Therefore, if
a “Penetrate and Patch” situation were to occur, it would already be too late: failures that
cause critical infrastructure to cease operations cannot be tolerated. A security policy
must be enforced that will maximize prevention of security flaws and minimize the
damage any unforeseen flaws can cause. This is where MILS, with its focus on core
security policies and partitioning of system resources can excel.
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3.1.2 Communication over the Internet
Since communication between RTUs and SCADA master units is occurring
increasingly over the Internet, this project will focus on using MILS to bolster the
security of networked RTUs. MILS is well-designed to allow for enhanced security of
networking functions if networking components are placed inside their own partition
controlled by the separation kernel’s security policies [8]. This means attacks on
networking protocols and features cannot spread damage to other partitions which are
running critical monitoring and control tasks. From [8], the benefits of this approach are
the following:
“Network facilities can be used by multiple application partitions.
“Network data is processed in unprivileged user mode, eliminating a vulnerability that is
a common avenue of attack.
“Complex protocol code such as Internet Protocol (IP) Ver. 6 can be evaluated and
certified independent of the applications using the code, enabling reuse of the evaluation
artifacts.”

The core idea here is to place any communication with the outside world (i.e. the
network) in its own partition, effectively cutting off all access to other applications except
through the middleware and kernel, both of which should be verifiably secure in a true
MILS system. The following diagram illustrates the separation of applications into their
own partitions on a MILS RTU.
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FIGURE 3.1: A MILS RTU
Figure 3.1 illustrates the overall security environment for a MILS RTU. Each
separate functionality can be placed in its own partition with its own user permissions and
security settings. We see here that networking functionality is contained in a single
partition. Likewise with the control and monitoring software that makes up the core of
the RTU is in its own, separate partition. Since all communication takes place through
the PCS and the secure separation kernel (see figure 2.1 for an illustration of the PCS
system), errors and security breaches cannot cascade from, for example, the networking
partition to the control partition. Also, information from the monitoring software cannot
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be compromised directly through the network connection. Also, as illustrated in the
middle partition, separate applications, and even operating systems, may also run on the
system with no threat to the control and monitoring software even if they are not verified
or known to be totally secure.
3.1.3 Handling of Network Errors in MILS
MILS provides another important feature to PCs used as RTUs in that severe
networking errors or attacks will not cause a cessation of operations throughout the entire
machine. Since MILS ensures that errors are detected and fixed locally in each partition,
monitoring and control software running in other partitions will not be affected by the
problems in the network-centric partition. The information obtained by these partitions
while the network partition is recovering can be sent to the SCADA master unit when
networking operations have resumed normal functionality, preventing loss of data due to
network component failure. This is especially important if an RTU is providing control
to critical components. As long as the RTU can act independently until the networking
partition has recovered, the hardware and infrastructure controlled by that RTU will not
function any differently than if the connection had stayed constant. Also, the networking
partition can run in unprivileged user mode, removing the potential for administrative
exploits [8].
A partitioning communication system can be used on both ends of the network
transaction to ensure end-to-end enforcement of security policies. Using a PCS in this
manner provides the benefits outlined in Table 3.1 (from [8]). This setup can be used to
securely synchronize and communicate over a network, as well as reduce the risk of
networking errors by removing backdoors into the communication system.
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Table 3.1 Benefits of Networking via PCS
1. Strong identity of each MILS node in the network
2. Separation by level or community of interest, MILS nodes connected by MILS crossdomain servers
3. Secure configuration and validation of consistency of all security databases
4. Secure image loading
5. Secure clock synchronization
6. Provisioning of bandwidth / quality of service
7. Suppression of covert channels (i.e. backdoors)
3.1.4 Attempts to Obtain a MILS Product
As is evident, this project at the onset had the objective of obtaining a MILS
compliant operating system and using that OS as the basis of an RTU. However, this did
not occur for a number of reasons, and the project has instead shifted to a related focus
that will be explained in sections following. First, an explanation of why a MILS product
could not be obtained in time for the completion of this project.
In September of 2005 LynuxWorks, the current leader in supplying MILS based
technology, was contacted about acquiring one of their operating systems for research in
this project. After several emails detailing requirements for the research, the
LynuxWorks representative determined that the product we would need is their
LynxSecure OS. This real-time OS is LynuxWorks’ attempt at creating a verified MILS
kernel at EAL 7, which would be the first of its kind. LynxSecure will also feature builtin secure networking, removing the need for the customer (or, in this case, researcher) to
implement his or her own networking solution.
This product would indeed provide a solid basis for this project’s research, but
unfortunately LynxSecure is still not available at the time of this writing. An analysis of
the market shows that no other comparable MILS-based product is yet available from
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LynuxWorks’ competitors, companies such as Green Hills and Wind River. LynxSC, an
interim version of LynxSecure designed to be verifiable at EAL 4, was scheduled for a
spring 2006 release. As of June 2006, neither LynxSecure nor LynxSC is available to the
market.
These complications led the researcher and his advisor to consider alternatives to
MILS that could be implemented and researched within the given time frame. This
research would focus on applying some of the security techniques that are defined in
MILS to RTUs. This project will provide a basis for secure RTUs which can be
expanded upon or modified when proper MILS products become available in the future.

3.2 Implementing an RTU Utilizing MILS Concepts

3.2.1 Alternatives to MILS
Since a MILS product could not be obtained in time, this project was refocused
into researching what benefits MILS would provide an RTU and discovering how to
emulate those benefits with a different system. There were determined to be two major
benefits that a MILS compliant system could provide, and these were abstracted into two
different areas of research.
First of all, MILS provides hard partitioning of resources, the management of
which is handled by the separation kernel. As discussed earlier, this resource
management scheme allows the system to contain any errors in a single partition,
nullifying the effects of such errors on any applications running in other partitions. If
inter-partition communication is needed, a PCS provides verified means of secure

25

communication between applications in separate partitions by directly invoking the
kernel’s security methods every time communication is required.
The second major benefit of MILS is the use of a small, hardened, verifiable
kernel to manage the system. The benefits of having a minimal kernel are many, not the
least of which is the reduction of complexity. This reduction of complexity means that
fewer errors should occur in the kernel creation process, as number of errors generally
correlates directly with the number of lines of code (LOC) in the kernel. Coding errors
residing in the kernel source often lead to exploits being discovered by malicious
individuals after the product is released ‘into the wild’. It is therefore desireable to
reduce the potential for errors up front, and a kernel with the minimum amount of
functionality (and therefore LOC) required is a step in this direction. Having a small
code base for the kernel also allows mathematical verification of the system, so a
quantifiable figure can be placed on the security of the system, a feature which is not
possible in a kernel with millions of lines of code.
With these two features of MILS in mind, a search for technology that would
provide these benefits was conducted. First of all, a version of LynxOS (version 4.0) was
obtained to determine if it was MILS compatible. Unfortunately, it is not as it does not
have a separation kernel. This OS distribution did provide one extremely useful feature,
which will be discussed in the following section.
Through extensive research, it was determined that brick wall partitioning would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without a MILS compliant operating system.
Resource separation has been mentioned in a few placed as a worthy goal even apart
from MILS, but there are few implementations of such available to the public. With this
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in mind, the project’s focus was shifted to exploring the benefits of a minimal kernel for
RTU security.
The benefits of such a kernel have already been listed. It should be noted,
however, that this project did not attempt to formally verify either kernel presented at any
EAL as the process is lengthy and, as a proof of concept and first step, the work
presented here was deemed sufficiently constructive for now.

3.2.2 RTU Based on Embedded LynxOS
As mentioned in the previous section, LynxOS 4.0 provides some interesting
features that proved beneficial for this project. First of all, LynxOS is an embedded, real
time operating system (RTOS) created by LynuxWorks, the company that will release
LynxSecure at some point in the near future.
LynxOS 4.0 was originally obtained because the researcher was attempting to
determine if it was MILS compliant. It is not, but some interesting ideas arose from the
study of this product. An RTU is much like an embedded device in that it performs
specific tasks, often on specific hardware, and reliability of operation is one of the most
important features of both devices. Also, LynxOS provides real-time scheduling support,
an obviously useful feature for monitor and control in an industrial setting.
Upon further inspection, an even more enticing possibility was discovered.
Included with the LynxOS demo is LynuxWorks’ Kernel Downloadable Image (KDI)
package. This package allows the user to make any desired modifications to pre-built
kernels or to create his or her own kernel. This KDI can then be booted from in a number
of ways, including from distribution media or over the network. The KDI package was
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used to strip all unnecessary functionality from the kernel, with RTU code created by Jeff
Hieb used to simulate the monitoring and communication of the RTU. The specific
implementation details of this RTU will be discussed in Chapter IV.

3.2.3 RTU Based on L4::Pistachio Microkernel
The Pistachio microkernel is currently the most widely used and supported
implementation of the L4 microkernel. The MILS principle of having a small,
minimized, verifiable kernel is similar to the idea behind the microkernel. The
microkernel paradigm seeks to strip all functionality from the kernel that can be handled
at a higher level. Applications called servers provide any functionality that does not need
direct access to the hardware, or that can utilize the already-existing kernel primitives for
such access. While the microkernel is not designed to be verified at an EAL, its emphasis
on minimalization and strict kernel control of all calls made to the hardware provide an
interesting parallel to MILS based kernels. For this reason, it was determined that a
microkernel based RTU could provide insights into the benefits of a minimal kernel for
RTU security, and therefore speak to the benefits of MILS for RTUs.
Pistachio was chosen as the microkernel to be studied in this project first for the
amount of documentation and support available. Also, there are user-friendly tools, such
as a comprehensive build system, that enhance and speed up development for Pistachio
systems. This build system, called Kenge, will be discussed in the following chapter,
along with all other implementation details for the Pistachio based RTU.
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CHAPTER IV: Prototyping RTUs using LynxOS and Pistachio

4.1 A LynxOS RTU
4.1.1 The LynxOS 4.0 Operating System
LynxOS 4.0 is a real-time embedded POSIX-compliant operating system that was
designed for use in critical systems where deterministic real-time performance is
essential. It was created by LynuxWorks, the company that is working on bringing the
first MILS compatible OS to market in the near future. LynxOS is compatible with
UNIX and is similar in architecture. Like UNIX, LynxOS provides full process and
thread support with fork and exec system calls. This means applications run in their own
protected address space, protecting the kernel from errors created by erroneous
application behavior. Because if this similarity to UNIX, many UNIX applications can
run with little need for alteration on a LynxOS machine with only a recompilation.
LynxOS can also run Linux binaries without the need for recompilation using a built in
Linux ABI compatibility layer.
The following table lists some of the features of LynxOS that led to the current
research on its suitability for an RTU. These features are listed in this form in the
documentation provided with the LynxOS 4.0 demo which was used in this project.
These features deal with both the operation of the kernel and the development tools
provided with the operating system.
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Table 4.1 LynxOS Features
Multiprocess and multithreaded environment
Hierarchical, UNIX-like file system
Kernel threads
Industry standard Networking (TCP/IP)
Support for diskless clients
Industry standard GNU tools, UNIX-like utilities and UNIX-like shell scripts
ROM-able kernel
Modular scalable architecture
Some of these features, such as support for diskless clients and ROM-able kernel,
could be helpful for small, embedded RTUs to be designed in the future. While this type
of RTU is not the basis for this project, it is a potential future benefit of utilizing this OS.
Features such as industry standard networking, as well as GNU and UNIX tools and
utilities, should ease the transition from more traditional development to development for
a real-time OS. These features, combined with the ability to create Kernel Downloadable
Images, make LynxOS a strong candidate for the basis of our prototype RTU.

4.1.2 Kernel Downloadable Images
A Kernel Downloadable Image (KDI) provides the basis for the bootable RTU
studied in this project. A KDI is an image that contains the LynxOS kernel, a file system,
and any application code specified by the user. This application code consists both of
system utilities that are included in any OS, such as network and file managing utilities,
as well as any code or applications that is desirable for use within the system represented
by the KDI. The KDI, once created, is bootable from flash memory, a disc, or over the
network.
The creation of a KDI allows the developer to remove any unnecessary modules
from the OS image to ensure that only the necessary applications and utilities are
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included. This allows the RTU developer to remove bloat, thereby reducing the memory
footprint of the system, and to remove any unforeseen security vulnerabilities that may
arise from unnecessary modules. Using a KDI also allows the RTU developer to instruct
the system to boot directly into the RTU code. This feature was used in this project and
will be discussed in more detail later.
A KDI is created by utilizing the mkimage utility provided by LynxOS. The
mkimage utility leverages a .spec (specification) file which contains information on how
the utility should configure the KDI. This .spec file contains attributes detailing the
initial set of files that should be included in the RAM disk memory image created by the
mkimage utility. Table 4.2 lists some of the more important attributes that were
employed in the .spec file used for this RTU prototype. These attributes are listed in the
mkimage.spec man page and in the LynxOS 4.0 demo documentation, with some slight
modification here for readability.

Table 4.2 Important Attributes of a .spec File
Attribute
Description
target=[x86|ppc]
The target system
osstrip=[local|all|none] Causes local symbol definitions to be stripped from the kernel
text file.
ostext=[ram|rom]
Designates where the kernel resides in the running system.
kernel=<path>
The path of the LynxOS kernel to be used in the image.
nodetab=<path>
The device node table corresponding to the kernel
root=[ram|rom]
Specifies that the root file system is either resident in RAM,
ROM, mounted from the device, or that there is no file system.
directory=
A directory on the target file system
file=
A file on the target file system
source=
Designates a fully qualified path name to a source file to be
copied into the target file system as the file specified in the
file=.
symlink
Designates a symbolic link of <pathname1> to <pathname2>.
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4.1.3 The Developer.spec Specification File
The demo for LynxOS 4.0 that was used for this project was shipped with a few
pre-built KDIs, including their corresponding .spec files. For this project, one of these
pre-built KDIs called “developer” was modified to provide the basis of our RTU KDI.
The developer KDI came with a specification file that included all networking
components and other utilities for a fully functional OS. For this reason, the .spec file for
this KDI, called developer.spec, was modified to conform to the desired functionality of
an RTU prototype. The mkimage utility creates an image ending in a .kdi file extension,
so to the image created in this project is named developer.kdi.
As the developer.spec file contained attributes related to providing full OS
functionality, including and Apache server, this file was modified to remove unneeded
modules from the KDI completely. Therefore, anything unrelated to networking or basic
system functionality was removed. Using the directory= and file= attributes, the
directory structure and included files for the KDI were specified. The original
developer.spec file contained a great many such attributes. Many of these were edited
out of the file in order to exclude them from the KDI. Exclusion of such attributes is
accomplished by commenting out the line in the developer.spec, with a #, that contains
the attribute that should be removed. Appendix I lists the developer.spec file used to
specify the attributes for this project’s KDI. The lines commented out with the # symbol
were attributes that were included in the original developer.spec file. There were actually
many more attributes that were removed for this project, but many of these commented
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lines were edited out of the file shown in the appendix to reduce the length of the .spec
file, allowing easier modification and readability.
The directory= attribute signifies a directory to be included in the image, and the
file= attribute does the same for a file. The main additions to the developer.spec file were
made in the directory=/net attribute. This attribute specifies what files and binaries
should be included in the /net directory of the KDI. The following four lines are the only
file= attributes specified for this directory:
file=rc.network
file=rtuDevice
file=rtu
file=rtuDevice.h

source=/tmp/newproj/60.developer/rc.network $(BIN_PERM)
source=./rtuDevice
$(BIN_PERM)
source=./rtu
$(BIN_PERM)
source=./rtuDevice.h
$(BIN_PERM)

The purpose of the file=rc.network attribute is to include the file indicated by the path in
the corresponding source= attribute. This source= attribute indicates the path to the file
on the development machine. The file indicated by the source= attribute will be copied
into the /net directory with the name corresponding to the file= attribute, in this case
rc.network. The $(BIN_PERM) flag indicates that the file that is to be included in the
image in a binary and is permanent, i.e. will not be deleted after the system is fully
booted and all modules indicated to begin on startup have are running.
The rc.network file indicated above is essential for the operation of networking
capabilities for the system. The purpose of the rc.network file, as well as the
modifications to it that were necessary for this project, will be outlined in the following
section. The other three targets of the file=attributes in the line above indicate the files
needed to run the RTU on the machine and will be discussed in the section following the
rc.network section.
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4.1.4 The Rc.network File
On UNIX and similarly styled systems, rc files are used to specify startup
commands for certain applications or the operating system itself. In this case there are
two rc files included in this projects KDI, rc.d and rc.network. The rc.d file contains
scripts designed to run any services that are desired upon system startup. This file is was
included in the pre-built developer KDI that was used as the basis for this RTU, and its
significance to the current topic is that it calls rc.network to run with the following lines
of code, which tells the kernel to look at the rc.network file if no scripts from that file are
currently running:
if [ -x /net/rc.network ]; then
/net/rc.network
fi

Of more significance to this project is the rc.network file. This file was also
included in the pre-built developer KDI. However, this file was modified in small but
significant ways that allow the RTU to function. The rc.network file contains scripts to
setup and enable networking on the machine booted with the developer KDI. It runs the
ifconfig and dhclient commands to configure networking for the machine, which explains
the attributes indicating the need to include these files in the developer.spec file. The
following lines of code are used to start the RTU portions of the code:
#
#
Start RTU Server
#
/net/rtuDevice &
start_it /net/rtu

The ‘/net/rtuDevice &’ start the rtuDevice portion of the code. The & indicates
that the application should run in the background, freeing the kernel up to run the next
script in the rc.network file. The ‘start_it /net/rtu’ command starts the rtu application,
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which passes connection information to rtuDevice, which handles monitoring and control
for pumps in an industrial plant. The origin and functionality of these applications will
be discussed in the following section. To see the complete listing of the rc.network file,
see Appendix II.

4.1.5 RTU Code
The code created for the RTU in this project was written by Jeff Hieb, a
researcher at the Intelligent Systems Lab at the University of Louisville who is currently
researching SCADA and RTU security. The RTU project created by Jeff was written in
C++ and makes use of several functions and custom headers spread out through many
files. The three code files most important to this project are rtu.cpp, rtuDevice.cpp, and
rtuDevice.h.
The rtu.cpp code creates a process that will listen for incoming connections using
a server socket. Incoming connections are communicated using the DNP3 protocol for
SCADA communication, the support code for which is also included in the RTU project.
A master control unit (MTU) can connect to the RTU via this method.
The rtuDevice.cpp code contains the bulk of what would be considered typical
RTU functionality. It contains data structures and functions used for monitoring and
controlling the levels of pumps in an industrial plant. It accepts connection to an MTU
via the connection initiated with the rtu process. Of course, the program does not
actually monitor or control any physical objects, but instead methods are included to
simulate typical values an RTU in this situation would encounter. There is a .NET based
MTU that can remotely connect to this rtuDevice process through the rtu process. This
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MTU provides a GUI for providing logon information to the rtu to allow the remote user
to monitor and modify values in the tanks. It also provides information on the latency of
communication signals, which will be discussed in Chapter V.
The rtuDevice.h file is a header file that provides a definition of message structure
for inter-process communication between the rtu and rtuDevice processes. This code
ensures that communication is standardized by providing structures for writing and
reading messages, as well as user and permission lists, among other features.

4.2 A Pistachio Based RTU

4.2.1 The Pistachio Microkernel
The Pistachio microkernel is an implementation of the L4 microkernel, a high
performance microkernel that improves upon previous attempts at microkernel design.
The L4 API is the design document that defines the requirements for implementing a
microkernel, and the Pistachio microkernel is the first version to implement the L4
Version 4 API. This API provides improvements in a number of ways over its
predecessors, such as 32 and 64 bit support, multiprocessor support, and fast local interprocess communication (IPC). Table 4.3 lists some of the features provided by an L4
microkernel that could prove beneficial to an RTU, including information from [28] and
[32].
Fast IPC improves performance of the system, so this would be beneficial to any
operating system or embedded device. The small number of fundamental mechanisms
and kernel defined policies, combined with the small image size for the kernel, provide
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an opportunity to study the MILS principle of a small, reduced kernel containing only
essential functionality. The privileged threads sigma0, sigma1, and root task are the only
threads that can make certain system calls. Sigma0 and sigma1 deal with memory related
requests, while the root task helps control overall system operation. These privileged
threads separating higher level threads from certain system calls behave similarly to how
MILS is designed to operate as well, as only highly trusted threads and processes have
direct access to the MILS kernel.
Table 4.3 L4 and Pistachio Features
Fast IPC with low overhead
Small number of fundamental mechanisms built in to kernel
Almost no kernel defined policies (such as memory,
protection, and process management)
Small size (from 40 to 200KB)
Privileged threads sigma0, sigma1, and root task

4.2.2 The Basis for a Pistachio RTU

The success of the LynxOS based RTU did not transfer fully to the Pistachio
microkernel. While the RTU code from Jeff Hieb is a solid foundation on which to build,
it is not yet compatible with Pistachio. A number of difficulties led to this situation, not
the least of which is the complexity of development for Pistachio due to the build system
it uses. Many of the calls used in the RTU code are not available in the C libraries that
are built in to the Pistachio build environment, and networking support is not included in
the kernel as was the case with the previous RTU based on the LynxOS kernel.
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Instead of reinventing the wheel and creating services to run on top of the
microkernel to allow full networking support as is required by the currently available
RTU code, this project has instead focused on unraveling the build system and providing
a simple example of how to build programs for Pistachio. A basic code example was
used that was inspired by a previous, greatly simplified version of an RTU created by Jeff
Hieb. It generates some random binary values, transmits them, and simulates some
network delay to compensate for the fact that networking is not currently supported.
Transmission, in this case, it to standard output, but it would be simple to modify this to
transmit over a network connection should one be devised in the future. In this manner,
the basis for a Pistachio based RTU has been established, even if the final product is not
feasible within this project’s time frame.

4.2.3 The Pistachio Development Environment
The Pistachio development environment, much like the Pistachio microkernel
itself, is primarily a research project. Whereas Pistachio was created and is maintained
by the System Architecture Group at the University of Karlsruhe, the development
environment for Pistachio is a product of the Embedded, Real-Time, and Operating
Systems (ERTOS) group funded by National ICT Australia (NICTA). ERTOS, as the
name implies, focuses on researching various embedded and real-time operating system
technologies. They have also modified the Pistachio microkernel to their own embedded
version, entitled NICTA::Pistachio-embedded, which focuses on embedded system
concerns such as resource utilization and performance. This L4 implementation would
be a strong basis for an RTU, but the greater amount of support and documentation
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available for regular Pistachio led the project in the more general direction. The build
system developed by ERTOS can be used either on their embedded variation or the
original Pistachio, and was therefore selected to provide the build environment for this
project. This build system and development environment is called Kenge, and consists of
four major components which will be discussed in the following sections.

4.2.4 The Kenge Build Environment
The Kenge build system is designed to create a bootable image based on the target
machine by compiling user-generated programs together with the Pistachio microkernel,
sigma0, roottask, and any other code specified for the image. The Kenge build system
utilizes four major components, including a scripting language, toolchains, and two
outside applications. Kenge uses the SCONS build system to build projects, the first of
the four components. The build scripts that are used by SCONS based on the Python
scripting language, the second Kenge component. If building occurs on the target
machine, the standard gcc version 3.3 toolchains are used for compilation of code. This
is the third component. The fourth and final component is the QEMU simulator, a full
IA-32 system simulator. [33]

4.2.5 The SCONS Build System
The SCONS build system is based on the Python programming language. Builds
are controlled by a top-level SConstruct file, which contains functions to set up the build
environment and combine all the separate modules into a final, bootable image. Lower
level SConstruct files are also used to specify how the system should and link build
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individual modules such as applications and libraries. Two SConstruct files were
essential to the build of the simple example rtu code. As both files are titled SConstruct,
they will be referred to as the high-level SConstruct and the low-level SConstruct.
The low-level SConstruct used for this project is a Python file which specifies that
this module contains an executable program, in this case the C code file rtu.c. Using the
env.MyProgram() function targeting rtu.c, the low-level SConstruct file specifies to the
build environment that rtu.c should be compiled and treated as an executable file. Using
the information from this low-level specification, the high-level SConstruct can properly
handle the rtu module once the high level build begins. The low-level SConstruct is
listed in Appendix III.
The high-level SConstruct is more complex, as it specifies the overall build
environment as well as any applications that should be included in the final bootable
image. In this file, the first step is to create the build environment for the machine, called
env as indicated in the low-level SConstruct explanation above. This environment
determines the compilers and flags necessary for the build process on the specified
machine. There are then calls to specify the kernel to be used, in this case the Pistachio
microkernel. The rootservers, special processes that begin at boot time, are specified
next, along with any libraries that are needed to compile programs in the build
environment. This program includes the “c” and “l4” libraries, as the simple rtu code is
written in C and the “l4” library contains code relating to compilation for the L4
microkenel. Any applications that are required to start at boot time are then specified. In
this case, the sigma0 memory manager process and the rtu application are indicated. The
final two scripts combine the kernel and applications into a single bootable image, and set
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that image as the default boot image for the system. The high-level SConstruct file is
listed in Appendix IV.

4.2.6 The QEMU Simulator
Kenge uses the QEMU simulator to simulate the runtime operation of bootable
images configured by SCONS. QEMU is a full IA-32 system simulator, meaning it can
run inside another operating system while simulating the functions of the created boot
image. The use of such a simulator eases the development process of a bootable
operating system by running the system within the development environment, eliminating
the need to hard boot the system from a disk, ROM, or a hard drive.
The Kenge environment is setup to simulate bootable images directly after a build
by setting a “simulate” flag when calling SCONS. One problem with using this method
for simulation was an inconsistency with how Kenge calls QEMU. When the simulate
flag is set, Kenge calls QEMU after the bootable image has been created with the
following command:
qemu –hda build/c.img –nographic –nics 0
The problem here is the current version of QEMU does not use the –nics flag to specify
the number of network interface cards to simulate, but instead uses a –net nic flag. Even
though this operation ends in an error, the simulate step is necessary to build the c.img
bootable image as specified in the command. This image contains all files necessary for
system boot. After the simulate command has been executed and stopped with an error,
the QEMU simulator can be manually started targeting the created c.img. The command
for this execution will be specified in the next section.
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4.2.7 Building, Booting, and Running the System
Once the SConstruct files are created and all needed support tools and files are in
place, Kenge is ready to build the system. The following command builds and links all
modules into a single bootable image:
scons machine=pc99
The machine=pc99 flag tells SCONS that the target machine is an IA-32 based PC. To
create and simulate the c.img bootable image, the following command is issued:
scons machine=pc99 simulate
As discussed in the previous sections, this command ends in an error but correctly
produces the c.img file that is needed for simulation. QEMU now should be called
manually with the following command:
qemu –hda build/c.img –nographic
This command boots c.img in the QEMU simulator. The –hda flag indicates that the
target is a hard disk image, while the –nographic flag starts QEMU without graphical
support. This saves memory and processor resources, as the bootable image created for
this project is purely text driven and has no graphical interface. The –net nic flag is not
needed because the default value is sufficient for this simulation.
Once the simulator has started, the kernel is booted along with the applications
specified in the high-level SConstruct file. The rtu code is started and begins its
operation by asking the user to press a key to begin. The code then generates and outputs
a pseudo-random binary value represented by hexadecimal, simulates network delay, and
attempts to measure the time needed for the operation. The user can then choose to press
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x to exit or any other key to end the program. The time measurement does not work
correctly when booted on Pistachio because the system calls needed for the functions in
the time.h header file are not available from the L4 microkernel to this process. The
system boots correctly, processes user input and processes and generates binary output.
Further work that could be done with this microkernel and build system will be discussed
in Chapter VI. The code for the rtu.c file is listed in Appendix V, and a sample output
listing for the run-time operation of this code is provided in Appendix VI. The code was
running in the QEMU simulator on top of the simulated Pistachio kernel.
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CHAPTER V: Performance and Security Evaluation

5.1 Quantitative Security Analysis

5.1.1 Objectives of Analysis
The goal of this project from the outset was to determine what benefits, if any,
MILS concepts could provide to RTU security. The LynxOS and Pistachio systems were
utilized for the similarities they shared with certain MILS concepts. This section will
attempt to scrutinize precisely what security vulnerabilities can be closed for each of
these approaches, what vulnerabilities are still open, and which of these open
vulnerabilities could be solved with a fully MILS compliant RTU.

5.1.2 Vulnerabilities Closed Using LynxOS
Table 5.1 outlines the security vulnerabilities that were closed by implementing a
prototype RTU with the LynxOS KDI development tools. These closed vulnerabilities
are mostly related to MILS concepts, meaning that they are also vulnerabilities that
should be closed by a fully MILS compliant OS and kernel.
Table 5.1 Vulnerabilities Closed with LynxOS
Small kernel, reducing complexity and risk
Increased periods processing protection
RTU applications run in unprivileged user mode
Removal of shell from KDI
Enforcement of remote communication using DNP3 protocol
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Most of these security improvements are specific to MILS concepts of secure
communication and processing. First of all, MILS calls for a kernel that is reduced in
complexity from more traditional kernels in order to reduce the complexity, and therefore
unforeseen risks, involved with a kernel containing hundreds of thousands or millions of
lines of code. MILS takes this a step farther and calls for a kernel to be formally and
mathematically verified. While such verification is not possible for the kernel used in
this RTU setup, the kernel nevertheless takes a step in the direction of MILS compliance
compared to more traditional kernels, and therefore increases confidence in the security
performance of the system.
Periods processing is a MILS concept which states that exploits using the
processor or networking interface cannot grant access to the system to an intruder (for
more, see Chapter II). Periods processing is one of the four security policies that defines
the basis of the MILS standard. The LynxOS based RTU increased assurance in periods
processing in two ways. First, all applications started after boot time run in unprivileged
user mode. This means that an intruder who manages to connect with the code from
rtu.cpp that allows the remote connection to the MTU should not be able to exploit this
connection to cause system changes that require root access.
One argument against this notion would be that an intruder could somehow gain
account information for root and achieve an apparently legitimate login with the stolen
information. This concern is addressed by the removal of the UNIX like shell from the
KDI. The shell is the command line user interface that allows a user to input commands
to the system. By modifying the developer.spec and startup scripts for the KDI, this
functionality was removed from the image in order to reduce system complexity and
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prevent exploits such as the one outlined above. While the removal of the shell ensures
that the system is secure from command line exploits, it also reduces the overall
usefulness of the operating system for everyday tasks. This was deemed to be a fair trade
off, because RTUs are highly specialized machines with the singular purposes of monitor
and control.
All network communication after the initial DHCP acquisition of an IP address is
handles via the rtu process. This process utilized the DNP3 protocol for SCADA
communication, effectively shutting out any connection attempt not conforming to the
protocol. While attempts by outside forces to connect could cause errors in the operation
of the rtu and rtuDevice processes, functionality could be built in to auto-reboot after
fatal errors or to allow reboots or re-running of applications with faults to be specified
over the network connection with the MTU. See Chapter VI for more on such potential
additions. While this security improvement is not related to MILS concepts, it is a side
effect of the way RTUs and MTUs communicate and is implicit within the operation of
this RTU, and is therefore included in the security analysis.

5.1.3 Vulnerabilities Closed Using Pistachio
The similarity of the microkernel concept to the MILS concept of a secure,
minimized kernel is significant. For that reason, microkernels address many of the
concerns that form the basis of the MILS standard. While this project did not create a
prototype RTU complete with full networking capabilities, many security improvements
resulting from the use of this microkernel setup become apparent on analysis of the
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features of L4 and Pistachio. Table 5.2 gives a brief overview of these security
improvements, which will be discussed in detail following the table.
Table 5.2 Vulnerabilities Closed with Pistachio
Small, minimally complex kernel
Most functionality provided by user level modules
Privileged threads
Address spaces separate services from one another
The use of Pistachio as the basis of an RTU, similar to the use of the LynxOS
kernel, builds on the concept of a minimal, secure MILS kernel. Pistachio goes beyond
the LynxOS approach to abstract out all non-essential functionality from the kernel and
replaces such functionality with higher level system and user services. As the complexity
of this kernel is greatly reduced compared to monolithic kernels that handle everything
from file systems to networking, this kernel can provide the RTU designer with greater
assurance that kernel functionality will not lead to errors. Pistachio improves over the
LynxOS kernel in this regard, as even that kernel contains much built in functionality and
is more similar to a monolithic kernel, albeit reduced and streamlined for embedded, realtime use.
The privileged threads sigma0, sigma1, and roottask provide another level of
abstraction between high level modules and certain system calls. As long as these
threads cannot be exploited, the system calls they are associated with cannot be exploited
either. This plays to the MILS idea that small, verifiable applications can run on top of
the kernel to provide another degree of security between non-verified modules and the
system. If the code behind these privileged threads is written correctly and is free of
security holes, intruders cannot gain access to any system calls these threads are
associated with.
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The idea of address spaces also supports a MILS concept, that being the idea of
resource partitioning to prevent error propagation throughout the system. Through the
microkernel’s inter-process communication (IPC) system, programs can reside in
separately assigned address spaces and still communicate through certain kernel IPC
calls. This also brings to mind the concept of a partitioning communication system
(PCS) for a MILS based OS. However, the microkernel IPC system is built in to the
kernel while the PCS is a middleware component that runs between user level processes
and the kernel. Also, while address spaces protect processes from damaging and being
damaged by errors in other memory spaces, there is no support for brick wall partitioning
of processor resources. Therefore this feature, while useful from a preventative security
standpoint, is not a substitution for the partitioning provided by a fully MILS compliant
system.

5.1.4 Remaining Vulnerabilities
Though these two approaches close many security vulnerabilities extant in current
networked RTUs, there are vulnerabilities still open that could be addressed by a full
MILS system. The first of these is the absence of resource partitioning between the
networking code and the monitor and control applications. An attack on system memory
could effect the LynxOS based RTU, while an exploit of the processor could effect either
system. The use of address spaces protects the Pistachio based system from some
memory errors, but is not as rigidly enforced as MILS brick-wall partitioning.
Another vulnerability is the lack of a verifiably secure means for end-to-end
network communication such as a partitioning communication system (PCS). While the
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DNP3 protocol provides a network interface between the RTU and MTU, it is not
verified like a PCS could be. A security verified PCS would provide the additional
benefit on a MILS system of securely handling partition-to-partition communication,
providing an additional layer of separation between the networking partition and monitor
and control partitions.

5.2 Performance Analysis

5.2.1 Latency Analysis for LynxOS RTU
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the creator of the RTU code used on the LynxOS
prototype also created an MTU to remotely connect to the rtuDevice process via the rtu
process. This MTU provides a graphical interface that allows the user to provide logon
information, logon to the RTU, and remotely begin the operation of the RTU. The user
can then monitor and change values in pumps simulated by the program. The MTU
constantly polls the rtuDevice to determine if any changes have taken place, and it
provides mechanisms to record and store latency measurements. Sample output from the
latency measurement of this program for a short connection session is listed in Appendix
VII.
Ignoring outliers due to loss of packets, which occurred only once during the data
gathering process, some analysis on the latency data is possible. The latency
measurement is time between a request for information from the MTU and the arrival of
the response from the RTU. It takes into account transmission time to and from the RTU
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as well as any processing that is required of the RTU once the request has arrived. The
output listed by the MTU is measured in milliseconds.
The data for this test ranges from 1.504661ms to 1.808051ms, with a median of
1.559416ms. The mean value for the latency represented by this data is 1.580219ms with
a standard deviation of 0.050565. The small standard deviation suggests that the data is
clustered closely around the mean, an assumption which is borne out by the proximity of
the mean and median values. These round-trip latency times fall below the sampling
time in most SCADA systems, showing the performance of this system is sufficient at
least over a LAN connection.
This test was conducted via a local area connection with the MTU and RTU
machines in fairly close proximity. A system distributed at greater distances would affect
performance, as would a connection over the Internet as opposed to intra-network
communications. However, the data obtained suggest efficient performance for the
LynxOS based RTU, performance which should be more than sufficient for most
SCADA communication.

5.2.2 Overhead Incurred from Use of L4
Microkernels, in their early days, were stigmatized for poor performance
stemming from the design principals that guided there creation. The L4 kernel was
created as a response to such criticisms as a way to determine if microkernel architecture
truly could provide performance comparable to that of other kernels. Studies conducted
on the performance of L4 can be applied to this project to determine if use of the
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Pistachio microkernel is feasible in terms of performance for the overall RTU
architecture.
Studies conducted by porting Linux to the L4 microkernel showed throughput to
be only 5% lower than that recorded from native Linux. Load testing determined that the
Linux L4 port, titled L4Linux, is 8.3% slower than native Linux if all loads are averaged
and 6.8% slower if only maximum load is accounted for. This is a huge improvement
over previous microkernels, which could perform up to 60% slower than native Linux,
but this data still does not lend itself well to high-performance applications. [34]
An empirical study of a full featured RTU would need to be conducted to
determine if a Pistachio can provide the required performance under run time conditions.
As with all improved security measures, the trade off of performance for security may be
necessary to ensure confidence in RTU operations over a network. An average 8.3%
performance hit should theoretically not be a problem for most RTUs as much of the
processing of data is handled by the centralized MTU, requiring less processor power and
fewer hardware resources than would be required otherwise. This is a reasonable trade
off for enhanced RTU security, but again an empirical analysis of performance, not to
mention analysis of costs if better hardware is needed for the L4 based RTU, would be
required before the deployment of such an RTU to the field.

5.2.3 Kernel Size
The size of the kernel used in an RTU can be a vital statistic in certain situations.
For example, an RTU based on a LynxOS KDI can be booted from flash memory or over
a network on a diskless system. This means the kernel and all application and support
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data must fit into the system’s flash memory, ROM, or RAM. The memory footprint
required for the kernel should therefore be minimal while still providing all required
functionality for the system. This brings to mind again the MILS concept of a
minimalized kernel containing only basic system calls and operations.
The size of the Pistachio kernel for IA-32 systems is 163,983 bytes, or about
160.14KB. This is within the typical 40 to 200KB range of microkernels sizes. The size
of this kernel should not be an issue, as it could fit on many cell phones with extra room
for application data. Of course, enough room must be provided for any servers providing
functionality not in the kernel as well as RTU code, so kernel size is not the only size
measurement that could be applied before deployment of an RTU design. It should also
be noted again that, with the decreased size of this microkernel, a certain performance
penalty is incurred which should be considered whenever obtaining a hardware
configuration for the RTU.
The LynxOS kernel is configured for the hardware on which it is running. For the
machine used in this project, the size of the LynxOS kernel is 1,246,244 bytes, or
1.1885MB. This is a significant increase over the size of the Pistachio microkernel
caused by the more traditional monolithic architecture of the LynxOS kernel. Even with
an increase of over 7.5 times, this kernel is still small and should easily fit within most, if
not all, memory configurations feasible for an RTU machine. It is also a significant
improvement over the size of more traditional monolithic kernels, such as the Linux
kernel.
As an indirect comparison, it can be noted that the latest full version of the source
for the 2.4 Linux kernel comprises almost 37MB worth of code and build rules in a
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compressed format. When uncompressed, the source measures over 167MB. While this
is not a direct comparison of kernel size, it demonstrates the difference in scale and scope
of a monolithic kernel compared to an embedded kernel or microkernel.
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CHAPTER VI: Conclusions and Future Directions

6.1 Conclusions
This project, upon initiation, set out to analyze what security benefits, if any,
MILS could provide for SCADA RTUs. Although a fully MILS compliant system was
not studied, the shift of focus toward architectures that provide features similar to MILS
allowed the researcher to study some of the security concepts that form the basis of
MILS. Because of this, the project has generally accomplished its initial goals. Several
vulnerabilities were closed by these systems, indicating that MILS could indeed prove
useful for RTU security, and that these alternatives could serve productively in the
interim.
The greatest success of this project came in the form of a fully functional RTU
running on top of the embedded LynxOS kernel. This RTU demonstrates how reducing
underlying system complexity, a MILS concept, can provide the basis for a fully
functional RTU while improving security by closing certain vulnerabilities. This system
allowed a quantitative analysis of closed security vulnerabilities as well as performance
analysis via a remotely connected MTU application. Since this RTU is based on a kernel
developed for embedded real-time applications, performance is high and overall required
resources are low, both desirable qualities for an RTU.
Because of the research presented in this project, the future RTU researcher has a
clear base from which to build upon to develop an RTU running on top of the Pistachio
microkernel. The concept of a microkernel is similar to the MILS concept of basing
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security around a minimal, secure kernel. The L4 microkernel goes so far as to provide
some small amount of resource protection via address spaces for resident memory
applications.
Even with the success of much of the research conducted during this project,
much remains to be done. There are many further avenues of study available such as
expanding the LynxOS RTU, developing a full-fledged RTU on top of Pistachio, and
studying a fully MILS compliant system, all of which would address valid questions not
answered by this project. Such future work is discussed in detail in the following section,
which should provide some guidance for future research on this topic, whether or not that
research builds upon this project.

6.2 Future Directions
6.2.1 Expanding the LynxOS-based RTU
While the creation of a prototype RTU utilizing the LynxOS kernel downloadable
image (KDI) creation tools was a success, there are many avenues still open for research
and expansion. First and foremost, a strong series of tests should be conducted to
determine the exact security strength of the networking code native to the operating
system. LynxOS uses many customized functions such as its TCP stack to provide
networking capabilities. Because any KDI inherits the portions of the LynxOS kernel
and major functionality as specified during KDI creation, thorough analysis of such
features would be required before any deployment of a LynxOS based RTU.
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A more robust performance evaluation would also be a beneficial addition to the
knowledge base for this RTU. Better access to kernel documentation and kernel
performance analysis from LynuxWorks would greatly aid this process. Currently,
LynuxWorks is rather closed regarding information about the inner workings of the
LynxOS demo on which the RTU is based. Advanced kernel performance evaluation
tools would allow measurements on the number of clock cycles needed for certain
operations as well as the amount of context switching, memory, and transfer time needed
for such operations. This information would allow the RTU designer to choose the
optimum hardware for each RTU design, thereby improving efficiency, utilization, and
performance yield for the unit.
As the RTU running on this system has no shell for command line user input,
mechanisms will need to be created to allow the system to recover from errors. For
example, the system could auto-reboot if the kernel encounters a fatal error, or a remote
reboot of a faulty application could be an option from the MTU controlling the RTU. It
would be impractical to perform a hard reboot every time a process, or even the entire
system, encounters a fatal error it cannot handle on its own, so such options would be
vital additions for future researchers to study. Another feature that would need to be built
into the communication code between the RTU and MTU would be the ability to
retransmit or recover dropped packets, as drops can occur even over a LAN as
demonstrated by the data in Appendix VII.
A future path of study for this machine would be customization of the LynxOS
kernel itself, as opposed to simply creating KDIs utilizing the default LynxOS kernel.
LynxOS provides the ability to accomplish this by modifying the kernel directory and
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supporting scripts and makefiles. According to the LynxOS 4.0 demo documentation, the
kernel can be modified for performance, size, and functionality. Such modifications
could reduce the complexity of the kernel and bring this system a step closer to the target
MILS concepts upon which this project is based.

6.2.2 Expanding the Pistachio-based RTU
Of the two RTU architectures researched for this project, the RTU based on the
Pistachio version of the L4 microkernel demonstrates the most room for improvement.
First and foremost, a robust networking interface for Pistachio must be developed as the
basis of communication for the RTU. The networking features should be in the form of
servers, separate modules running on top of the microkernel, instead of integrated in the
kernel itself. This setup, the basis for microkernel design, ensures future extensibility and
eases the maintenance and expansion of the networking modules in the future. It also
follows the MILS specification of a secure, minimally complex kernel to control the
system.
The code created for this project to work with the Pistachio build system and
environment is not an RTU, but instead simulates some operations of an RTU as a proof
of concept for microkernel use. If research in this area is to continue, it will need to build
upon the design and prototyping work presented in Chapters III and IV of this document
to create a robust, fully featured RTU based on Pistachio. A difficulty encountered
during the research into the Pistachio microkernel is the lack of clear, efficient
documentation to outline the features of the system. This is true even for Pistachio,
which appears to have the greatest amount of documentation support from the
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microkernel development community. For this reason, the work presented in this
document will help the future researcher by demystifying development for a Pistachio
based system.
A more thorough performance evaluation should be conducted on this
microkernel to determine its suitability for monitor and control applications. Since the
inception of microkernels, there has always been concern over their performance. Many
of these issues have been addressed in one way or another, but precise measurements
should be recorded to determine if the overall greater amount of context switching
required for operations with a microkernel could prove too detrimental to the
performance of the system. The reverse should also be researched to determine if
microkernels could provide performance increases in certain areas.
There are many implementations of the L4 microkernel and, as progress with this
kernel is currently carried out through research and academic institutions, each
implementation differs and can provide better functionality in certain areas. The
Pistachio implementation was chosen because of its current popularity for use in research
and its relatively strong amount of documentation. As mentioned previously, the
NICTA::Pistatchio-embedded L4 implementation would be a good fit for an RTU, as its
focus in on further reducing kernel complexity and memory footprint. The Fiasco
microkernel is also popular in the research world. While this microkernel is not a direct
L4 implementation, it was designed to be compatible with L4 as it was created to serve as
a new basis for a pre-existing L4 project focusing on operating system quality of service
requirements. The l4hq.org website is the central hub for obtaining information about
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current and legacy L4 projects, and should be consulted in the future if a desire for
furtherance of the use of L4 in a SCADA RTU context exists.
One upcoming L4 project should prove of interest to the researcher willing to
investigate the use of L4 for RTUs. That project is the Secure Microkernel Project (seL4)
from ERTOS and NICTA [35]. The goal of this microkernel is to use formal methods
and computations to provide a high degree of security assurance in the kernel itself to
provide the basis of trustworthy embedded systems. This seems to take a page directly
from the MILS concept of kernel verification, and could be looked at in the future if
research in this direction continues.

6.2.3 Toward a MILS Compliant RTU

This intent of this project at the outset was to study the benefits gained by
applying the MILS standard to SCADA RTUs. As the focus of the project was forced to
shift away from directly applying MILS to an RTU, the objective of applying MILS
concepts to an RTU remained unchanged. This project has demonstrated how some of
these concepts may improve RTU security, but the work in this direction has only just
begun.
This project was not able to study the impact of brick-wall resource partitioning
for RTU security. This feature of MILS would appear to be its strongest aspect in the
face of network security threats, as discussed in Chapter III of this document. Such
partitioning would ensure networking errors could not propagate to effect control and
monitoring applications and would provide a greater amount of confidence in the overall
system.
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As mentioned in Chapter II, a number of vendors are offering products currently
or in the near future that are designed to utilize MILS concepts. Green Hills and Wind
River are two embedded OS developers offering products with MILS-like separation
kernels. LynuxWorks also offers such products, and plans to introduce the world’s first
verified MILS kernel in the near future. The researcher who desires to study a true MILS
system should watch for this product.
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APPENDIX I: Developer.spec File
The developer.spec file is used to specify the desired components for a bootable
image created by the mkimage utility and kernel downloadable image (KDI) creation
tools. This is the file that allows the developer to include any applications or code that
should be executed on the target machine. Some comments were edited out for length
and readability. Attributes attached to unwanted files are commented out to exclude
those files from the final bootable image. This file is modified from the developer.spec
file included with the demo version of LynxOS 4.0 that was used for this project.

# Kernel
target=$(TARGET_ARCH)
osstrip=false
ostext=rom
kernel=$(BSP_DIR)/a.out
nodetab=$(BSP_DIR)/nodetab
# Boot-up method
#flags=a
# File System
free=200
inodes=10
root=rom
#Text Files:
strip=none
text=rom
resident=false
# KDI files
directory=/
file=init
file=KDI.sh

$(DIR_PERM)
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/init
source=$(PROJECT_DIR)/KDI.sh

directory=/bin
# file=netstat
# file=tcpdump
file=ps
# file=vi
# file=chmod
file=hostname

$(DIR_PERM)
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/netstat
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/tcpdump
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/ps
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/vi
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/chmod
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/hostname
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$(BIN_PERM)
$(FILE_PERM)

$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)

file=ifconfig
file=drivers
file=devices
file=ping
file=dhclient
# file=ls
# file=login
file=reboot
file=sh
file=tset
file=mount
# file=drinstall
# file=devinstall
file=umount

source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/ifconfig
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/drivers
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/devices
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/ping
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/dhclient
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/ls
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/login
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/reboot
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/bash
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/tset
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/mount
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/drinstall
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/devinstall
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/umount

$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(S_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(S_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)

directory=/usr/bin

$(DIR_PERM)

directory=/etc
# file=passwd
# file=starttab
# file=hosts
$(FILE_PERM)
file=dhclient-script
$(FILE_PERM)
file=dhcpd.conf
$(FILE_PERM)
file=inetd.conf
# file=protocols
$(FILE_PERM)
# file=services
# file=resolv.conf
# file=hosts.equiv
# file=fstab

$(DIR_PERM)
source=./passwd
$(FILE_PERM)
source=./starttab
$(FILE_PERM)
source=$(PROJECT_DIR_PORT)/hosts
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/etc/dhclient-script
source=$(PROJECT_DIR_PORT)/dhcpd.conf
source=./inetd.conf
$(FILE_PERM)
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/etc/protocols
source=./services
source=./resolv.conf
source=./hosts.equiv
source=./fstab

$(FILE_PERM)
$(FILE_PERM)
$(FILE_PERM)
$(FILE_PERM)

directory=/etc/rc.d
file=rc
source=$(PROJECT_DIR_PORT)/rc $(BIN_PERM)
directory=/net
# file=inetd
file=rc.network
$(BIN_PERM)
# file=rtu_server
file=rtuDevice
file=rtu
file=rtuDevice.h
# file=rshd
# file=telnetd
# file=routed
# file=ftpd
# file=rlogind
# file=irshd
# file=portmap
# file=rc.local
# file=unfsio
directory=/mnt

$(DIR_PERM)
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/inetd
$(BIN_PERM)
source=/tmp/newproj/60.developer/rc.network
source=./rtu_server
source=./rtuDevice
source=./rtu
source=./rtuDevice.h
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/rshd
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/telnetd
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/routed
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/ftpd
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/rlogind
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/irshd
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/portmap
source=./rc.local
source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/unfsio
$(DIR_PERM)
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$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)
$(BIN_PERM)

directory=/tmp
directory=/usr/tmp

$(TMP_PERM)
$(TMP_PERM)

symlink /bin/sh /bin/bash
symlink /etc/rc.d/rc /bin/rc
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APPENDIX II: Rc.network File
The rc.network file contains scripts associated with running networking features
at system startup. The calls to the rtuDevice and rtu processes are contained within this
file. Extraneous comments have also been removed from this file to reduce length and
improve readability. This file was modified from the rc.network file included with the
pre-build developer KDI.

#
#/bin/sh
#
# $Header: /cm/src/net/inetd/RCS/rc.network,v 5.46 2002/01/29 23:37:08
mooring Exp $
# A little start up routine to capture errors.
start_it()
{
echo "Running $1"
$@ || echo "
failed with exit code $?"
}
################################################################
#
Network startup procedure
################################################################
#
# 'cuz of the bash propensity to want a TERM variable at all costs,
# and the fact that the networking daemons really don't want
# one, we nuke it right here and now.
unset TERM
cd /net
#
# Configure the software loopback device "lo" with hostname "localhost"
#
/bin/ifconfig lo0 localhost
#
#
my_name is used for Ethernet interfaces
#
bplane_name is used for the SCMP interface (only on 68k, PowerPC)
#
my_name="lynxdemo"
#bplane_name="insert-your-bplane-name-here"
#
#

Change hostname appropriately to coincide with /etc/hosts
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#
NOTE: If there is only the SCMP interface available, change
#
"my_name" in the next line to "bplane_name".
#
hostname "$my_name"
#echo "hostname is `hostname`"
################################################################
#
This starts the 3COM EtherLink XL 3C90X
start_it /bin/ifconfig elxl0 up
dhclient
echo Network interface configured
#[ -f /etc/syslog.conf ] &&\
#start_it /bin/syslogd
#
#
Start network daemons
#
#start_it /net/inetd
#
#
Start RTU Server
#
#start_it /net/rtu_server
/net/rtuDevice &
start_it /net/rtu
##################################################################
#
# Commands for NFS Server support
# Edit the /etc/exports file to specify the directories that are to be
# exported for mounting by remote machines.
#
#start_it /net/portmap
#start_it /net/mountd
#[ -s /etc/exports ] &&\
#echo exporting directories for remote mount &&\
#start_it /bin/exportfs -av
#start_it /net/nfsd
#start_it /net/rpc.statd
#start_it /net/rpc.lockd.svc
#start_it /net/rpc.lockd.clnt
# Source a local script if it's there
# Here's a very good place to start xntpd
#[ -x /net/rc.local ] && . /net/rc.local
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APPENDIX III: Low-level SConstruct
This is the SConstruct file used to include the rtu.c code in the build conduced by
the Kenge build environment. This was modified from a similar SConstruct file included
with the Hello project from ERTOS.

# SConstruct file for rtu.c module
# Modified from file included in Hello program by ERTOS
Import("*")
obj = env.MyProgram("rtu",
LIBS=["c"],
CPPDEFINES=[("RTU", "\\\"%s\\\"" %
args["phrase"])])
Return("obj")
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APPENDIX IV: High-level SConstruct
This SConstruct file is used by the Kenge build system to link together all
modules with the kernel to form a single bootable image, which can then be simulated or
used as a system boot option. This file was also modified from a similar SConstruct file
included in the ERTOS Hello project.

# High level SConstruct
# modified from Hello project by ERTOS
# First step is to include our real build tools
# tools/build.py includes the KengeEnvironment
try:
execfile("tools/build.py")
except IOError:
print
print "There was a problem finding the tools directory"
print "This probably means you need to run:"
print " $ baz build-config packages"
print
import sys
sys.exit()
# phrases detoning language
phrases = {
"english" : "Hello, world",
"dutch":
"Hello, wereld",
"german": "Hallo, Welt",
"french": "Bonjour, monde",
"italian": "Ciao, mondo",
"spanish": "Hola, mundo"
}
add_config_help("Options:\n")
add_config_list("lang", "Which language do you want to compile for",
"english", phrases.keys())
# setup the build environment
env = KengeEnvironment()
# specify the kernel to use as "pistachio"
l4kernel_env = env.Copy("kernel")
#l4kernel = l4kernel_env.Pistachio()
l4kernel = l4kernel_env.Application("pistachio")
# Add support libraries for rootserver
rootserver_env = env.Copy("rootserver", LINKFLAGS=["-r", "-N"])
rootserver_env.AddLibrary("l4")
rootserver_env.AddLibrary("c", system="l4_rootserver")
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# setup the applications to run
sigma0 = rootserver_env.Application("sigma0")
rtu = rootserver_env.Application("rtu", phrase=phrases[lang])
# combine the kernel and applications
# into a single boot image
bootimage = env.Bootimage(l4kernel, sigma0, rtu)
Default(bootimage) # This is the default build target
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APPENDIX V: Rtu.c
This code simulates some simple functions of an RTU, such as outputting data
and measuring transmission time. It is simply used as a stub to support the proof of
concept of a Pistachio based RTU.

/* rtu.c */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <time.h>
uintptr_t _stack[128];
void * _stack_top = (void*) &_stack[255];
char bytes[30];
char press;
char escape;
int main(void)
{
escape = 'x';
press = 'y';
for(int i = 0; i< 30; i++)
{
bytes[i] = 0x61;
}
int i = 3;
time_t t1, t2;
printf("Press any key to begin.\n");
while (press != escape)
{
press = getchar();
t1 = time(NULL);
bytes[i]=bytes[i]+i;
printf("RTU: ");
printf("%d\n",i);
printf("0x%x\n",bytes[i]);
i = (i + 771) % 30;
/*insert some delay to account for transfer time*/
for(int j=0; j<999; j++)
{
(void) time(&t2);
}
printf("Time: %d\n", (int) t1);
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printf("Press x to exit or any other key to continue.\n");
}
printf("Goodbye!\n");
return 0;
}
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APPENDIX VI: Sample Output for Rtu.c
Listed below is some sample output created by booting the project image, which
will run the rtu.c program after the kernel and all other necessary tasks have loaded.
Notice the time is always output as 0. This is because Pistachio does not support the
system calls and variables that allow the code in the time.h header to work properly.
Also note the code prompts the user to continue or exit after each output of a generated
value. This was done to give the user a feel for the execution time and input for the
Pistachio based system and could easily be modified to run more autonomously. The
value after RTU: is the current, pseudo-randomly generated index of the byte array that
stores all hexadecimal output values. The hexadecimal values listed are the pseudorandomly generated output values.

RTU: 3
0x64
Time: 0
Press x to exit or any other key to continue.
RTU: 24
0x79
Time: 0
Press x to exit or any other key to continue.
RTU: 15
0x70
Time: 0
Press x to exit or any other key to continue.
RTU: 6
0x67
Time: 0
Press x to exit or any other key to continue.
RTU: 27
0x7c
Time: 0
Press x to exit or any other key to continue.
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APPENDIX VII: Timing_log.txt
The following is sample output of the latency measurements of communication
between the RTU and MTU programs. The value denoted by the ‘*’ indicates an outlier,
and is likely caused by a dropped packet during transmission. The data has been
formatted in a table for readability. Measurements are in milliseconds.
1.659708147
1.564444643
1.554387499
1.558019245
1.517511304
1.523657336
1.517231939
1.514158922
1.514717653
1.504660509
1.656914496
1.579530359
1.536787497
1.565841469
1.567797024
1.552711308
1.55718115
1.551314483
1.553549404
1.651047829
1.641549415
1.563885913
1.65495894
1.540698608
1.544889085
1.66529545
1.555784325
1.552431943
1.563047818
1.552711308
1.639873224
1.558298611
1.553270039
1.656076401
1.561092262

1.542095434
1.552431943
1.55662242
1.552152578
1.559416071
1.55662242
1.552152578
1.559416071
1.611657348
1.56807639
1.552711308
1.619479571
1.672838308
1.549358927
1.634285922
1.554108134
1.561092262
1.552711308
1.66641291
1.560254166
1.661943068
1.554946229
1.554666864
1.60467322
1.552152578
1.541816069
1.550197022
1.549638292
1.75106054
1.564165278
1.554666864
1.652724019
1.550755752
1.559416071
1.552711308

1.566679564
1.550476387
1.536508132
1.735416093
1.574781152
1.550197022
1.636800208
1.554108134
1.554666864
1.520863685
1.561371627
1.672000212
1.565841469
1.738768475
1.662781164
1.569473215
1.550476387
1.56919385
1.56807639
1.553549404
1.559974801
1.554108134
1.557460515
1.739327205
1.565282738
1.556901785
1.561371627
1.549917657
1.559974801
1.55662242
1.550755752
1.53259702
1.559974801
241.9408053 *
1.570590676
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1.557460515
1.635962113
1.553549404
1.560254166
1.557460515
1.65440021
1.512203367
1.604393855
1.643225605
1.561371627
1.554108134
1.669485926
1.539022418
1.554108134
1.55606369
1.55773988
1.563047818
1.555784325
1.641549415
1.560812897
1.555784325
1.551314483
1.554108134
1.563047818
1.547962101
1.561092262
1.556343055
1.55606369
1.743238317
1.575060517
1.555504959
1.614171634
1.548241466
1.569473215
1.566679564

1.538184322
1.652444654
1.534552576
1.611657348
1.564444643
1.559416071
1.538463687
1.553549404
1.65384148
1.570311311
1.558019245
1.566400199
1.553828769
1.647974812
1.689041484
1.555504959
1.550755752
1.573663692
1.552990673
1.656355766
1.559695436
1.572266866
1.557460515
1.808051023
1.56807639
1.558857341
1.651885924
1.515835113
1.572266866
1.54405099
1.563606548
1.559695436
1.661104973
1.625904968
1.521981146

APPENDIX VIII: List of Acronyms
Acronym
API
COTS
DHCP
DNP-3
EAL
ERTOS
IPC
KDI
LOC
MILS
MTU
NEAT
NICTA
PCS
POSIX
RTOS
RTU
SCADA
TCP/IP

Meaning
Application Programming Interface
Commercial Off The Shelf
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
Distributed Network Protocol version 3
Evaluation Assurance Level
Embedded, Real-time, and Operating Systems
Inter-Process Communication
Kernel Downloadable Image
Lines of Code
Multiple Independent Levels of Security
Master Terminal Unit
Non-bypassable, Evaluatable, Always Invoked and Tamperproof
National Information Communication Technology Australia
Partitioning Communication System
Portable Operating System Interface
Real Time Operating System
Remote Terminal Unit
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
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